



a plausibility probe of core assumptions









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Parker, C., Nohrstedt, D., Baird, J., Hermansson, H., Rubin, O., & Bækkeskov, E. (2020). Collaborative crisis
management: a plausibility probe of core assumptions. Policy and Society, 39(4), 510-529.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2020.1767337
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Dec. 2021
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpas20
Policy and Society
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpas20
Collaborative crisis management: a plausibility
probe of core assumptions
Charles F. Parker , Daniel Nohrstedt , Julia Baird , Helena Hermansson ,
Olivier Rubin & Erik Baekkeskov
To cite this article: Charles F. Parker , Daniel Nohrstedt , Julia Baird , Helena Hermansson ,
Olivier Rubin & Erik Baekkeskov (2020) Collaborative crisis management: a plausibility probe of
core assumptions, Policy and Society, 39:4, 510-529, DOI: 10.1080/14494035.2020.1767337
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2020.1767337
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 18 May 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 2386
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 2 View citing articles 
ARTICLE
Collaborative crisis management: a plausibility probe of core
assumptions
Charles F. Parker a, Daniel Nohrstedt a, Julia Baird b, Helena Hermansson c,
Olivier Rubin d and Erik Baekkeskov e
aDepartment of Government & Centre of Natural Hazards and Disaster Science, Uppsala University, Uppsala,
Sweden; bEnvironmental Sustainability Research Centre, Brock University, St. Catharines, Canada;
cDepartment of Security, Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defense University, Sweden; dDepartment of
Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark; eSchool of Social and Political Sciences,
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ABSTRACT
In this article, we utilize the Collaborative Governance Databank to
empirically explore core theoretical assumptions about collaborative
governance in the context of crisis management. By selecting a subset
of cases involving episodes or situations characterized by the combi-
nation of urgency, threat, and uncertainty, we conduct a plausibility
probe to garner insights into a number of central assumptions and
dynamics fundamental to understanding collaborative crisis manage-
ment. Although there is broad agreement among academics and
practitioners that collaboration is essential for managing complex
risks and events that no single actor can handle alone, in the literature,
there are several unresolved claims and uncertainties regarding many
critical aspects of collaborative crisis management. Assumptions inves-
tigated in the article relate to starting-points and triggers for collabora-
tion, level of collaboration, goal-formulation, adaptation, involvement
and role of non-state actors, and the prevalence and impact of political
infighting. The results confirm that crises represent rapidlymoving and
dynamic events that raise the need for adaptation, adjustment, and
innovation by diverse sets of participants. We also find examples of
successful behaviours where actors managed, despite challenging
conditions, to effectively contain conflict, formulate and achieve
shared goals, adapt to rapidly changing situations and emergent







It is a central precept of good governance to prepare for predictable risks aswell as unthinkable
contingencies and to invest the necessary resources to minimize the impacts on people and
society from catastrophic events when they occur (Ansell, 2019;Widmalm, Parker, &Persson,
2019). To effectively prepare for and respond to complex crises, such as natural hazard events,
terrorist attacks, pandemics, or, other large-scale accidents and emergencies, an array of
responsible organizations must be able to collaborate across sectors, disciplines, jurisdictions,
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territorial boundaries, and levels of authority (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Bynander &
Nohrstedt, 2020; Nohrstedt, Bynander, Parker, & ‘t Hart, 2018; Parker & Sundelius, 2020).
Supplying societal security – safeguarding citizens from harm, protecting critical
infrastructure, and ensuring the capability of government and civil society to function
under stress – necessitates a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, and often even a ‘whole-of
-society’ approach, which in turn necessitates collaborative governance and collaborative
crisis management capacities (‘t Hart & Sundelius, 2013; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Sundelius,
2006). From this viewpoint, the provision of safety and security requires the active
involvement of a variety of actors and stakeholders engaging in collective action across
organizational boundaries to rapidly furnish expertise and capabilities, both of which are
essential for managing events that surpass the capacity of individual organizations.
Scholars of crises, disasters, and emergencies have long been sensitive to the collective-
action challenges related to preparing for and responding to risks, threats, and extreme
events. Social science research, dating back to the disaster sociology of the 1960s, has zeroed
in on studying the related phenomena of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration
(Drabek, 2007). More recently, developments in collaborative public management and
policy networks have advanced our understanding of collaboration in crisis management
(Ansell & Gash, 2007; Choi & Brower, 2006; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010) and as
collaborative governance research flourished, so did scholarship on collaborative crisis
management (Bynander & Nohrstedt, 2020; McGuire, Brudney, & Gazley, 2010; Nohrstedt
et al., 2018). However, mirroring the pattern we see in collaborative governance more
broadly (Douglas et al., 2020), the existing research on collaborative crisis management is
dominated by case-studies and small N comparative case-studies with limited effort to
explore the generalizability of core assumptions. Past empirical research has also been
biased toward North American and European cases (Nohrstedt et al., 2018).
In this article, we conduct a comparative case-study involving seven suitable cases
(Table 1) of collaboration in crisis management selected from the Collaborative
Governance Databank. These cases, covering events in Europe, North America, Asia,
and Africa, specifically represent instances of collaborative governance, defined by the
Collaborative Governance Databank (Douglas et al., 2020) as ‘a collective decision-
making process based on more or less institutionalized interactions between two or
more actors that aims to establish common ground for joint problem solving and value
creation’. We focus here on a subset of collaborative governance cases pertaining to
episodes or situations characterized by a level of urgency to act, combined with a threat to
Table 1. Overview of Collaborative Crisis Management Cases
Case (period) Policy domain* Country or area
Volcanic ash cloud (2010, 2011) Environment and climate, Public safety, Technology and
transport
Europe
Wildfire Fort McMurray (2016) Environment and climate Canada
Earthquakes Van and Ercis (2011) Security and public safety, Disaster response Turkey
Floods (2011– 2016) Environment and climate Vietnam
Foodborne disease (2011) Agriculture, Economy and trade, Health, Food Germany, France
Ebola epidemic (2014) Health West Africa
Wildfire Västmanland (2014) Agriculture, Environment and climate, Infrastructure planning,
Health, Security and public safety, Emergency management
Sweden
*Domains predefined by the Collaborative Governance Databank (Douglas et al., 2020, see specifically coding item #9)
and indicated by case coders. Multiple domains possible.
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core societal values, and uncertainty considering the nature of the situation and the
viability of different courses of action (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017).
Although it is often said that each crisis is unique, in our view, collaborative crisis
management involves a set of common challenges that demand further comparative
research. Therefore, we aim to broaden the scope of inquiry in relation to previous
studies that explore assumptions concerning collaborative crisis management in single
cases. Clearly, the seven cases examined here are still far too limited and eclectic as an
empirical basis for conducting reliable validity ‘tests’ or reaching robust generalizations
(George & Bennett, 2005). Instead, we start by utilizing the suitable cases that now exist
in the Databank to conduct a ‘plausibility probe’ in an effort to make an empirically
informed judgment whether more ambitious and systematic tests of the assumptions
are warranted (Eckstein, 1975). The areas investigated in the article include starting-
points and triggers for crisis management collaborations, formal planning versus
emergent collaborations, level of collaboration, bottom-up and top-down processes,
the upscaling dilemma, goal-formulation, adaptation through intra-crisis learning, the
involvement and role of non-state/governmental actors, and the prevalence and impact
of political infighting.
Past research and theoretical departure points
Collaborative crisis management can broadly be defined as the collective efforts of
multiple autonomous actors working across organizational boundaries, levels of author-
ity, and sectors to prepare for, respond to, and learn from risks and extreme events that
disrupt our modern society (Bynander & Nohrstedt, 2020; Nohrstedt et al., 2018). For
a crisis – defined as a situation or event that threatens core values and necessitates urgent
action in the face of uncertainty – to be managed effectively, decision makers and
involved organizations must pull together in order to contribute to the specific phases
and activities that make up crisis management including preparedness, mitigation,
response, recovery, and learning (Boin et al., 2017).
Prior research has examined the factors, institutional arrangements, and processes that
enable and constrain collaborative crisis management including starting-points, the jur-
isdictional level at which the collaboration occurred in various phases, goal-formulation,
adaptation, the types of actors participating in collaboration, and the role of political
infighting (Choi & Brower, 2006; Kapucu, 2006; McGuire & Silvia, 2010). Other aspects
have also been examined, but we concentrate on these areas because they constitute core
theoretical assumptions in the literature that are also all covered in the coding framework
for the case databank. These theoretical departure points are introduced below.
Starting-points and triggers: formal planning versus emergent CM collaborations
Collaborative governance arrangements emerge under different circumstances, be
it externally directed by law or authority, self-initiated by its participants, or
independently convened by a third party (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Provan &
Kenis, 2007). Because responsible authorities are expected to protect their citizens
and respond effectively when disaster strikes (Ansell, 2019; Boin et al., 2017;
Parker, Persson, & Widmalm, 2019), designated emergency management
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organizations and networks are generally given the responsibility to prepare for
and respond to known contingencies, commonly referred to as ‘routine emergen-
cies’. However, when a crisis strikes, due to the scale, novelty, or cascading
dynamics of the event, it can require the mobilization of a more diverse network
of organizations to respond to and manage the situation (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2010;
Nohrstedt, 2016; Nohrstedt et al., 2018).
What remains unclear is whether crises provoke responsible organizations to rely
more strictly on previous collaborative arrangements with familiar partners or whether
they drive new collaborations that expand the number of involved actors (Bodin,
Nohrstedt, Baird, Plummer, & Summers, 2019). It has been noted in the literature that
emergencies, which require rapid decision-making due to the urgency and time-pressure,
are not ideal times for establishing emergent collaborations with new partners or
expanding existing collaborative arrangements (Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010). The
issue of participation also raises questions regarding the potential costs and benefits
related to the scale of collaboration, including transaction-costs, incentives to contribute
to the collective effort, and opportunities for frequent interactions (Poteete & Ostrom,
2004).
Level of collaboration: bottom-up and top-down processes
Large-scale crises and disasters are often so complex that the management and response
of the event will consist of multiple organizations and can involve multiple levels (Boin &
Bynander, 2015; Bynander & Nohrstedt, 2020; Nohrstedt et al., 2018). In many systems,
collaborative crisis management is organized according to what has been called the
‘principle of disaster subsidiarity’ (Boin et al., 2017) or a bottom-up process that is
guided by the proposition that local authorities are best situated to plan for and respond
to crises and emergencies in their geographical area, but, depending on the situation, or if
there is a lack of capacity to cope with the situation, upscaling will be required. This can
be a tricky and contentious issue and previous research has identified the ‘upscaling
dilemma’ as a key issue in collaborative crisis management (Boin & Bynander, 2015). For
example, it can be challenging to forge agreement about when higher authorities should
get involved, what form their involvement should take, and how they should relate to
actors at lower levels of authority (Boin et al., 2017; Nohrstedt, Baird, Bodin, Summers, &
Plummer, 2020).
It should be kept in mind that not all systems are organized according to the disaster
subsidiarity principle and some, such as in Vietnam and Turkey, for example, are
centrally organized at the national level and have a much more top-down hierarchical
character (Hermansson, 2016). Nonetheless, the reality that extreme events and crises
can overwhelm single actors and cross geographical, organizational, and sectoral
boundaries has created the need for organizations, regardless of the level of govern-
ment, to collaborate and coordinate their efforts, vertically as well as horizontally, to
meet these challenges (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin & Bynander, 2015; Galaz, Moberg,
Olsson, Paglia, & Parker, 2011; Parker, Stern, Paglia, & Brown, 2009; Parker &
Sundelius, 2020).
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Goal formulation
Jointly formulating and realizing shared goals has been identified as an essential aspect of
collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2007). At the same time, it has been recognized that
a narrow focus on goal-attainment can limit a full understanding of collaboration,
which in practice entails complex interactions leading to differential outcomes at the
level of individual organizations, networks, and for society at large (Keast & Mandell,
2013).
Goal-attainment is crucial, yet also problematic, as a basis for understanding colla-
borative crisis management. Considerable time and resources are often devoted to
establishing structures and routines to support shared problem perceptions and goals
during crises. Examples include practices for achieving ‘shared situation awareness’ and
‘joint operating pictures’ to support sense-making among diverse sets of actors (Boin
et al., 2017). However, focusing exclusively on the ability of actors to articulate and
achieve joint goals is insufficient as a basis for assessing effectiveness, especially since the
collaborating actors can put up smoke screens with the motive of attempting to make
themselves look good after the fact and that might obscure the complexity of setting
consensus goals. Clearly, there is more at stake and what is required for judging crisis
management as a success or a failure goes beyond narrow conceptions of goal-attainment
(McConnell, 2011; Nohrstedt et al., 2018).
Nonetheless, the formulation and attainment of shared goals are key aspects of crisis
management. Given transaction costs, one may also expect goal-attainment to be chal-
lenging; that is, the collaborative crisis response outcomes may not correspond with goals
and ambitions that were formulated at the onset.
Adaptation through intra-crisis learning
Adaptation is a key attribute that can determine the success of collaborative governance
arrangements in turbulent environments. This is based on the insight that when faced
with complex and uncertain problems, actors are generally better off if they can con-
tinuously monitor, review and, if needed, adjust their understanding of problems, their
working methods, and solutions. Such adaptive capacity is a defining characteristic of
a resilient system capable of renewal (Berkes, 2007; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg,
2005) and an attribute of well-functioning collaborative governance regimes (Emerson &
Nabatchi, 2015). Adaptation has also been depicted as a key feature of so-called High
Reliability Organizations, which are found in areas where the costs of errors are high (for
example, nuclear power, air traffic control, military operations). These organizations are
generally able to switch from a normal mode of operation to rapid response and
contingency when required (La Porte, 2006). These capacities are important in colla-
borative crisis management as well.
Acute crises provide a unique context in this regard. Most discussion about adaptation
concerning complex policy problems usually focuses on adaptation over time, where
actors gradually learn and adjust in iterative and incremental cycles through trial-and-
error. This is also a common emphasis in collaborative governance studies on learning
(Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011) and literature on network evolution (Nohrstedt & Bodin,
2014). Crises are different, since actors have limited – if any – time to review and reflect
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upon their plans and actions. Moreover, crises are situations where information is either
incomplete or overwhelming, which complicates accurately assessing the situation and
evaluating the efficacy of any actions taken. Consequently, actors often resort to ‘fuzzy
gambling’ and make decisions under substantial uncertainty and with a limited sense of
probabilities (Moynihan, 2008).
Despite these difficulties, adaptation is viewed as crucial for successful crisis response
(Harrald, 2006). More generally, adaptation is depicted as a success factor that explains
why (some) collaborative arrangements are effective in addressing complex problems.
Collaborative arrangements are particularly important as they support several dimen-
sions conducive to adaptation, including inclusiveness, diversified leadership, knowledge
generation and learning, and resources (Emerson & Gerlak, 2014). Similarly, learning,
flexibility and the ability to improvise are often described as characteristics of an effective
crisis response system (Comfort, 2002; Wise, 2006).
Non-state/governmental actors
Governance, in many modern societies, has undergone a paradigmatic change in which
greater levels of power, influence, and responsibility have gradually been transferred
from the state to private actors and stakeholders (Peters, 2012). Crisis management is no
exception to this development, as recognized by the key role of business, non-profit, and
voluntary groups in the various phases of planning for, responding to, and recovering
from crisis events. Examples of such constellations include various forms of public-
private partnerships, for example, critical infrastructure, resilience building, crisis
response operations, community physical reconstruction, and collaborative learning
(Chen, Chen, Vertinsky, Yumagulova, & Park, 2013).
Such arrangements are more or less formalized and range from institutionalized
arrangements, such as contractual partnerships, to more informal and emergent ad hoc
social networks that form in response to an acute need to integrate and coordinate
resources and actions across sectoral boundaries. These collaborative arrangements also
vary according to the types of non-state actors that participate, including non-profit
organizations, voluntary associations, community actors, and private interests. Multi-
organizational approaches based on such cross-sectoral interactions and relationships
have been described as an important condition for reducing the risk of natural hazards,
such as the ‘whole-of-society’ approach promoted by the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction to reduce disaster losses worldwide.
Political infighting
One could imagine that the atmosphere created by a dramatic crisis would bring
organizations closer together and temporarily suspend any bureau-political frictions.
Although there may be examples of such experiences, findings from crisis management
research often seem to point in the opposite direction, recognizing the role of conflict,
inter-organizational tensions and infighting – a phenomenon disaster experts have
coined the ‘battle of the Samaritans’ (Rosenthal, ‘t Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991).
Conflicts are a natural part of collaborative governance more generally and many
collaborative arrangements entail mechanisms for mediating and resolving conflicts
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among the participants (Emerson&Nabatchi, 2015), such as developing a conflict manage-
ment plan, insisting on participation based on good faith, and maintaining transparency
(O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). During crises, the potential negative effects of unresolved
conflicts are many, including the breakdown of channels for vital communication and
coordination. For these reasons, the absence of political infighting has been depicted as
a condition for effective crisis response networks (Boin & ‘tHart, 2010) and why when
problems do arise there is a need for some actors to take on leadership roles to resolve or
mitigate conflicts between other actors (Sullivan, Williams, & Jeffares, 2012).
Methods
Case-selection
To select cases for this analysis, we included from the Collaborative Governance Databank
all cases featuring episodes or situations characterized by the combination of urgency,
threat, and uncertainty. At the time this search was conducted (August, 2019), the databank
contained a total of 44 coded cases, out of which seven fulfilled these criteria (Douglas et al.,
2020). The final selection includes cases from different parts of the world (Europe, North
America, Asia, and Africa), which provides valuable analytical variance across cases and
contexts regarding, for example, geography, income-levels, democracy, and types of socio-
political systems. Furthermore, this subsample includes different types of events; although
the cases involve natural hazard events and one disease outbreak (as opposed to so-called
‘man-made’ accidents, such as terrorism or infrastructure breakdowns), there is still
considerable variability in event type, spanning geophysical (volcanic activity and earth-
quakes), hydrological (floods), climatological (wildfires), and biological (epidemic) hazards.
Given this variance, we can at least rule out the possibility that theoretical assumptions – if
supported in the majority of the seven cases – only apply with regard to certain geogra-
phical areas, socio-political contexts, or event types. Table 1 summarizes the seven cases,
including time-period, policy domain, and geographical area.
Plausibility probe
Our objective here is to compare these seven cases, to empirically explore the validity of
theoretical assumptions regarding collaborative governance in crisis management. This is
done systematically as we consistently use the same indicators (coding items) derived
from the Collaborative Governance Databank across the seven cases to see whether the
evidence confirms core assumptions. Hereby, we expand the orbit of inquiry in compar-
ison to previous studies that explore assumptions in single cases. Nonetheless, it is clear
that the seven cases reviewed here are too limited as an empirical basis for conducting
a thorough ‘test’ of the validity of the claims examined here. Instead, we aim for
a ‘plausibility probe’ in an effort to make an empirically informed judgment whether
more ambitious and rigorous tests are warranted.
As originally envisioned by Harry Eckstein (1975, p. 108), ‘[. . .] plausibility probes
involve attempts to determine whether potential validity [of hypotheses] may reasonably
be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing, which are almost
always considerable, but especially so if broad, painstaking comparative studies are
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undertaken’. In this regard, here, the selected assumptions are examined across the seven
cases, which, thus, fulfil the role as ‘inductive feedback devices’ for this particular subset
of cases (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999). Although the sample is obviously too small to focus on
frequency distribution, we seek to establish whether each assumption receives empirical
support across the whole subsample, or, if it rather seems limited to one or a few cases, or,
if it is not supported at all. Again, following the logic of a plausibility probe, assumptions
that receive broad support would be worthy of further investigation in a bigger sample of
cases, which we hope becomes possible once the Collaborative Governance Databank
accumulates additional cases.
Operationalisations
We reviewed each case, focusing on the codes derived from the coding-framework that
were deemed relevant for assessing each assumption respectively. This was done system-
atically by focusing on the same codes across all seven cases. More specifically, we relied
on numeric codes as well as qualitative information (open questions) for each case. Table
2 summarizes these codes by assumption.
Crises are dynamic events that can dramatically change over the course of the episode
and one of the advantages of the database is it enables researchers to follow and compare
the evolution of collaborations over time (to document change and stability in, for
example, jurisdictional level, the type and number of involved actors, and the presence
and importance of goals). Nonetheless, as the article that introduces the Collaborative
Case Databank acknowledges, while this resource provides new opportunities, it also
Table 2. Overview of coded elements.
Assumption
Coding frame-
work item(s) Summary description of coding
Starting-points Item #16 How the collaboration was first initiated (self-initiated by participants,
externally directed by law or authority, Independently convened by
a third party)
Item #23 Type and number of actors involved in the collaboration process (from
the start, middle, and end of the period)
Jurisdictional level Item #7 The level – local, regional (subnational), national, international,
supranational (UN, EU, etc.), multi-level) – at which the collaboration
occurred (from the start, middle, and end of the period)
Goal-formulation Item #10 Ambitions driving the collaboration, including any changes between the
start, middle, and end of the period
Item #13 Open question about challenges, ambitions, and evolution of
collaboration
Item #55 Outputs or outcomes (same ambitions as in Item #10) produced by the
collaboration
Item #61 Open question about outputs or outcomes produced
Adaptation Item #10 See above
Item #13 See above
Item #14 Pre-history of mutual engagement among core actors
Item #15 Trust among participants
Item #21 Open question about history of collaboration, initiation
Item #52 Innovations produced by collaboration
Non-governmental actors Item #23 Types of actors participating in collaboration, including any changes
between the start, middle, and end of the period
Political infighting Item #10 See above (focus exclusively on containment of conflict as ambition)
Item #34 Role of leadership in effectively resolving or mitigating conflicts between
actors within the collaboration
POLICY AND SOCIETY 517
comes with limitations (Douglas et al., 2020). For example, the framework cannot
capture all aspects of collaboration and other researchers may want to include different
or additional questions and indicators. The ability to accurately capture each dimension
of collaboration furthermore depends on the judgement of the coder in applying each
coding item to the cases (Douglas et al., 2020).
It should also be noted that the cases examined in this article primarily deal with
situational crises and the functional dimensions of managing them. Crises, of course, also
have strategic and political dimensions, dealing with institutional and accountability
issues that, other than examining political infighting, we do not explore in this article.
The databank does cover institutional and accountability issues, however, those dimen-
sions were not the focal points of the cases covered here. Hopefully, those dimensions can
be looked at in greater depth once the number of collaborative crisis management cases
increases in the future.
Results
Starting-points and triggers: formal planning versus emergent CM collaborations
Do crises, which demand quick decisions under conditions of urgency and time-
pressure, provoke responsible organizations to rely more strictly on pre-existing colla-
borative arrangements with familiar partners or does it spur new collaborations that
expand the number of involved actors? Does what we see in our cases square with claims
that crises are not conducive for emergent collaborations with new partners or the
expansion of existing collaborative arrangements?
As might be expected in crises being handled by actors with formal mandates and
responsibilities, in four of the seven cases the initiation of the collaborations were
externally directed by law or authority (the floods in Vietnam, the earthquakes in
Turkey, the Canadian wildfire, and the Ash cloud crisis). Two were self-initiated by
participants (the Swedish wildfire and the German Foodborne disease outbreak) and one
was independently convened by a third party (the Ebola case).
We can see that even if the genesis of collaboration was externally directed, acute
crises can give rise to emergent collaborative processes and arrangements. A case in
point is the 2010 ash cloud crisis, in which the European Commission gave
EUROCONTROL, the organization responsible for safe air traffic management in
Europe, the responsibility of proposing a solution to the massive disruption to air
travel that had paralyzed the European air space in the wake of the eruption of the
Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull (Nohrstedt, 2013; Parker, 2015). This collaboration
produced a temporary solution that unlocked the crisis, led to a revised volcanic ash
contingency plan, new Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) guidelines, and the formalization
of the improvised collaborative arrangement through the establishment of a European
Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC). Once activated, the EACCC is chaired by
the Commission and EUROCONTROL and participants include the EU Presidency, air
navigation service providers, airspace users, airports, as well as other relevant stake-
holders (Parker, 2015).
Self-initiated collaborations, such as the ones observed in the Swedish wildfire and the
German foodborne disease cases, also resulted in emergent collaborative arrangements.
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As we discuss below, both cases are good examples of adaptation through intra-crisis
learning.
Regarding the question of whether crises spur the expansion or contraction of the type
and number of actors involved in the collaboration process, in contrast to what might be
expected (Kapucu, Arslan & Demiroz, 2010), none of the cases exhibited contraction. In
six of the seven cases, we saw expansion, particularly in the type of actors involved (public
organizations/civil servants, political organizations/politicians, private for-profit organi-
zations, private non-profit organizations, and citizens). In one case (Vietnam floods), the
number and types of actors involved were stable throughout the collaborative process.
Level of collaboration: bottom-up and top-down processes
The coding framework allows us to see at which jurisdictional level the collaboration
started and whether and how that changed over time by adding actors from other levels.
In our cases, the local level was involved in five of the seven collaborative arrangements.
In two cases (the Canadian wildfire and the German foodborne disease outbreak) the
collaboration was initiated at the local level and in a third (the Swedish wildfire) the
initial collaboration involved the local and regional (subnational) level, but in all three of
these cases, the crises escalated so quickly that upscaling occurred. In the Swedish case,
the national level got involved along with additional types of actors (Bodin & Nohrstedt,
2016; Bodin et al., 2019; Nohrstedt et al., 2020). In the cases of Vietnam and Turkey, the
collaborative arrangements were centrally directed from the national level. Vietnam
included the regional and local levels throughout the collaborative process (Rubin,
2014), while in Turkey the local level only became involved after the 2011 Van and
Erciş earthquakes struck (Hermansson, 2019).
The German foodborne disease case is interesting because the collaboration started at
the local level but quickly expanded and upscaled to include the regional (subnational),
national, and EU (supranational) levels. The collaborative response to the large-scale
outbreak of enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC) in Germany in 2011 brought
together the local states, medical authorities, risk assessment authorities, consumer
protection authorities, and the European Food Safety Authority to contain and fight
the outbreak (Berthod, Müller-Seitz, & Sydow, 2014).
The ‘upscaling dilemma’ emerged as a key issue in several of our cases. As discussed
earlier, it can be far from clear when higher authorities should get involved, what the scope
of their involvement should be, or how they should interact with actors at lower levels of
authority (Boin et al., 2017; Boin & Bynander, 2015). The Canadian and Swedish wildfire
cases are good examples of this challenge. The Swedish case illustrates the difficulties
involved with making a collective decision concerning the appropriate moment to upscale,
which was complicated by divergent perceptions among actors at local and regional levels
concerning the need to bring in actors at higher levels (Nohrstedt et al., 2020). In the
Canadian case, collaboration was initially solely at the local level but, due to the rapidly
escalating wildfire, the collaboration quickly upscaled to the provincial level with some
federal support. Incident Command System protocols, because of the fire’s severity,
mandated collaboration between the local and provincial authorities. Initially, the local
authorities were reluctant to relinquish control and the upscaling phase from municipal to
provincial leadership was not a smooth transition and the desired configuration of involved
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actors and at what level was contested. Over time, the municipality becamemore amenable
to a province-led effort and ultimately the collaboration proved successful in achieving its
goals of fire containment and preventing loss of life. Furthermore, a study of the involved
wildfire responders in both cases found that respondents rated the collaborative effective-
ness to be quite high (Bodin et al., 2019).
The codes suggest that the local level was not involved in two of the cases in our subset.
The absence of the local level in these instances appears to be due to the nature of the
crises and the collaboration processes studied. The 2010 and 2011 ash cloud events were
transboundary crises involving multi-level collaboration between national, European,
and international aviation authorities and the 2014 Ebola case only looked at the
international response of the UN and non-affected national governments to raise funds
and encourage countries to send health care workers to respond to the epidemic.
Goal-formulation
To address assumptions about goal-attainment in the seven cases, we first look at whether
the formulation of shared goals constituted a key ambition driving the collaboration
and, second, whether this ambition was achieved. Here it is important to note that the
coding framework only captures whether actors were able to formulate shared goals in
the form of accomplishing a plan to tackle a shared problem. Hence, this should not be
conflated with whether goal-attainment was actually achieved.
The evidence suggests that the formulation of shared goals constituted an important
ambition driving collaboration in all seven cases. In fact, the coded cases show that the
development of a plan (our proxy for goal formulation) constituted the core ambition for
most collaborative arrangements. However, a closer look at case-study material unveils
three different scenarios.
In the first scenario, goal-formulation remained the core ambition of the collaboration
throughout all phases in the observed period. In these cases – including Ebola, the Swedish
wildfire, and Vietnam floods – actors appear to have worked continuously with developing
and adjusting joint plans. In the second scenario, as seen in the Turkish earthquakes and the
Canada wildfire, formulation of shared goals did not constitute a core ambition. In these
examples, other ambitions – such as increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
response – were listed by the coders as being more important drivers of collaboration. In
the third scenario, the importance of goal-formulation grew gradually as the events escalated.
This pattern was noted in the volcanic ash case and the foodborne disease outbreak in
Germany. In both cases, the development of shared goals initially appeared subordinated to
other ambitions but gradually became the core ambition of the collaboration. We may only
speculate as to what may account for these differences. One potentially important factor
includes the level of hierarchy (in more hierarchical systems, such as Vietnam, Turkey, and
Canada, it may be the case that goal-formulation is more formalized through, for example,
chain of command). The scale of the event and if actors have prior experience to draw from
may also be important; in large, unprecedented situations – such as the wildfire in Sweden
and Ebola – actors may be faced with novel problems that require continuous efforts to
formulate shared goals and plans. Yet, these explanations remain speculations warranting
future examination.
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Turning to whether the formulation of shared goals was achieved in the end, we find
that this was an aspect of collaboration that worked well overall. While we miss data for
the Ebola case, codes for the other six cases suggest that actors, in general, succeeded in
developing a shared plan. Again, the level of success in achieving shared goals varies over
time and is also linked to the level of importance attributed to goal-formulation in each
phase. In other words, in those cases where goal-formulation was depicted as a core
ambition of the collaboration, this was generally achieved.
Adaptation through intra-crisis learning
In our cases, we cannot observe processes of adaptation directly based on, for instance,
empirical evidence of individual or collective learning. However, the coding framework
enables us to systematically review the cases in search for indications of adaptation,
focusing specifically on reported changes in the structure and process of collaboration in
the context of crises.
All seven cases reviewed here exhibit some elements of adaptation. First, all cases give
evidence of how the challenges and, in turn, the ambitions of the collaborative arrange-
ments evolved. Some of these cases are examples of processes of quick escalation where
the number and nature of the challenges changed relatively rapidly. This was particularly
evident during the two wildfire cases and the earthquakes in Turkey. Other events
escalated more gradually, as in the case of Ebola, the ash cloud crisis, and the Vietnam
floods. The specific managerial problems related to these events also changed over time,
which provided stimuli for change in the collaborative crisis responder systems. Again,
the two wildfire events are illustrative. In both cases, the rapid escalation brought on
a range of problems related to, for example, evacuation, public communication, and
inter-organizational coordination, which led to a rapid increase in the number of actors
involved in the response. This also resulted in the adjustment of the organizational
structures from more localized operations to large-scale inter-organizational arrange-
ments. A similar development was noted in the Ebola case, which started as a more
limited operation involving NGOs, which was gradually scaled-up to an international
response coordinated by the UN and with assistance frommany other countries. Another
example of how challenges shift is provided by the foodborne disease outbreak in
Germany, which initially was focused on more technical aspects that were handled by
an ad hoc multi-organizational task force of experts from different authorities. Later on,
the focus moved to a political debate regarding the alleged lack of coordination, which
swung attention to other actors and expanded the crisis from a functional to a political
perspective (Nohrstedt et al., 2018).
We also see some evidence that individuals that were involved in the response to these
events adapted relatively quickly to emergent organizational structures. In the cases, there are
several examples of temporary arrangements that emerged to meet the need for inter-
organizational coordination in response to unforeseen problems. Many cases, including the
Swedishwildfire, the foodbornedisease outbreak, and the ash cloud crisis, gave rise to different
types of emergent inter-organizational collaborative arrangements that were necessary to
achieve coordination in the absence of pre-existing structures and routines. Interestingly,
these arrangements appear to have worked relatively well. For instance, although some
tensions arose in all cases, there is evidence that trust among the actors developed within
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a relatively short time-frame. In the case codes, we see no evidence of tensions or conflicts
hampering the responses.
These experiences also corroborate the role of multi-organizational collaborative arrange-
ments as forums for innovation and improvisation, which is conceptually linked to adapta-
tion. In the literature, there has been a surge in interest in the role of collaborative governance
in fostering innovation in public policy and services. This work acknowledges the role of
diverse experience, resources, and knowledge as a basis for generating innovative solutions
and practices (Sørensen&Torfing, 2011). During the foodborne disease case, for example, the
ad hoc multi-organizational task force was important in developing and implementing a new
study method for identifying disease carriers.
Non-state/governmental actors
Concerning the involvement and role of non-governmental actors, our review of the seven
cases confirms that a broad range of non-state actors can become actively involved inmajor
crisis events and that they can play key roles in their resolution by working side-by-side
with representatives of political and public organizations. The coding-framework identified
three broad organizational categories, including for-profit organizations (business), non-
profit (for example, interest groups and other associations), and citizen groups.
Representation of these categories of organizations varied across the seven cases with
non-profit and citizen groups beingmost common. For-profit organizations participated in
the response to five of the seven cases, including earthquakes in Turkey, the two wildfire
cases in Sweden and Canada, the volcanic ash cloud case, and the foodborne disease case.
Non-profits appeared in four cases, including the two wildfires, the earthquakes, and Ebola.
Finally, citizen groups appeared in all cases but the ash cloud crisis and Ebola.
One pattern that can be noted across the seven cases is that non-state actors appear to
join the response at some point after the acute event erupted. Except for theVietnam floods,
where citizen groups were actively involved at the onset, and the earthquakes in Turkey,
where for-profit organizations joined the response early on, these groups mostly became
actively involved sometime in the middle of the period observed. Non-profit organizations,
however, appeared more frequently in the initial phases of three cases, including the
earthquakes in Turkey, the wildfire in Sweden, and Ebola.
The participation of these organizations appears to fade somewhat toward the end of
these events. Although non-state actors seem to be more engaged at the end of the
observed period compared to the beginning, it appears that their participation fades after
the acute phase of the event. However, the evidence suggests that participation during the
end-phase differs by organization type, with non-profit organizations participating most
frequently (in three cases: earthquakes in Turkey, the wildfire in Sweden, and Ebola) and
for-profit organizations being less involved (ash cloud case and Canadian wildfire case).
Yet, these trends should be looked at with considerable caution since the participation of
these organizations in the collaborative response varies overall (with different organiza-
tions being involved in the seven cases).
Overall, the cases reviewed here confirm that non-state actors participate quite actively
in different settings and across the different phases of collaborative crisis management.
The fact that public organizations participated in all phases across all seven cases (except
during the initial phase of the Ebola epidemic) underscores the need to continue
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investigating conditions for achieving effective cross-sectoral collaboration in crisis
management.
Political infighting
Turning to the evidence regarding the prevalence and impact of political infighting, we
can infer the level of conflict in the seven cases indirectly by looking at whether contain-
ment of conflict constituted a core ambition of the collaboration. In other words,
although we cannot directly measure the level of conflict in each case, we can study
conflict indirectly by focusing on the weight attached to conflict management within the
collaboration.
We find that conflicts were not significant in the seven cases. In two cases (Ebola and
earthquakes in Turkey), the codes suggest that conflict seemed to play a limited role in
the response. However, in cases where conflicts did occur, the available evidence appears
to indicate that these were relatively effectively contained, partially through leadership
involvement. Except for two cases (the foodborne disease case and the Vietnam floods
case), conflict mitigation was not a core ambition in any of the cases. In fact, in the
remaining five cases, the evidence suggests that conflicts played a limited role in the
collaborative response or did not occur at all. Also, no clear temporal trends are evident
across these cases, which suggest that the level of conflict remained relatively stable over
time. One exception was the foodborne disease case, where conflict mitigation was a core
ambition in the early stages of the crisis response but became less important as the
situation unfolded.
Regarding the role of leadership in effectively resolving conflicts among actors, we
only have valid codes from four of the seven cases (the other three reported missing data
on this dimension). Therefore, the empirical basis for drawing any conclusions about the
role of leadership is quite limited. Looking at the four cases with valid codes (wildfires in
Sweden and Canada, Vietnam floods, and the volcanic ash case), the evidence suggests
that leadership was only moderately effective in mitigating conflicts between actors. In
addition, the level of effectiveness remained relatively stable over time, yet with a small
increase towards the later phases. However, we attribute the moderate levels of effective-
ness in crisis containment to the fact that conflict resolution did not constitute a core
ambition in any of the coded cases. Thus, we conclude (with some caution) that the level
of conflict remained relatively low in these cases and that the leadership was relatively
successful in containing any tensions when they erupted.
Conclusion
In this article, we compared seven cases of crisis management derived from the
Collaborative Governance Databank in an effort to empirically explore the validity of
theoretical assumptions about collaborative crisis management. The study hereby con-
tributes to the cumulative effort to advance knowledge about collaborative governance in
general and collaborative crisis management in particular.
Our study empirically explores theoretical assumptions concerning triggers, level of
collaboration, goal-formulation, adaptation, the role of non-state actors, and political
infighting. The seven cases are obviously too limited as a basis for empirically testing and
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generalizing theoretical expectations. However, this subsample represents a selection of
different hazard event types derived from different parts of the world, which enable us to
probe the plausibility of assumptions in different countries and settings. Although we
cannot verify causal linkages, we can identify and discuss the associations and patterns
we saw across the cases.
The findings confirm that crises represent relatively rapidly moving and dynamic
events that raise the need for adaptation, adjustment, and innovation in the context of
collaboration. Studies of collaborative governance in cases of ‘normalcy’ cannot offer
insight into how collective-action unfolds given situational constraints and stressors
caused by considerable urgency, uncertainty, and imminent threat to the core values of
a system. Past collaborative governance research has depicted crises as one incentive
among others that create awareness and pressure actors to engage in collaboration
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Building from this study, we can better specify how these
incentives play out in practice.
One recurrent observation across the seven cases is that crises do not just create some
general pressure for swift and broad collaboration. Rather, demands for collaboration are
likely to shift over time, which necessitates adaptation by actors. Such adaptation often
takes place in relation to ‘upscaling’ whereby an increase in the scale of an event outstrips
resources at lower levels and creates pressure to shift responsibility and steering to
organizations at higher levels (Nohrstedt et al., 2020). The evidence reviewed here,
however, confirms that there is rarely consensus around decisions to move responsibility
up the government hierarchy because actors have different understandings of local
capacities and the right timing for shifting responsibility. Experiences from the cases
also shed light on other adaptive behaviours, including the creation of ad hoc collabora-
tive arrangements and adjustment of organizational structures and ambitions of colla-
boration. These insights corroborate the observation that collaborative crisis
management brings a unique set of challenges characterized by uncertainty, conflicting
priorities, and ad hoc behaviours (O’Leary & Bingham, 2009).
We have also noted several behaviours and outcomes that can be depicted in terms of
success – or at least as more positive experiences. Here we show that actors in most cases
were relatively successful in formulating and pursuing a shared plan. Again, it should be
recognized that the importance attributed to goal-formulation varied between the cases and
also over time. However, in cases where goal-formulation was defined as an important task,
it worked relatively well. Another positive observation is that even in the cases in which pre-
existing structures for collaboration were initially lacking, actors managed to establish
viable collaborations in an ad hoc fashion. These constellations entailed relationships across
sectoral and jurisdictional boundaries. Although conflicts did occur, the coded cases
indicate that actors developed mutual trust within a relatively short time-span and also
addressed conflicts in ways that did not hamper the collective response. The level of conflict
remained relatively low in all cases and when conflicts emerged, they were, in most cases,
sufficiently contained through leadership involvement.
These experiences can help to advance the understanding of performance, effective-
ness and outcomes of collaborative crisis management, which has been elevated as an
important next step to advance the research agenda around collaborative crisis manage-
ment (Nohrstedt et al., 2018). In this regard, the takeaway message from this study is
threefold. First, analysts should be attentive to unexpected success-stories (Di Baldassarre
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et al., 2018). Generally, one would expect that a disruptive crisis creates an atmosphere
where productive collaboration is encumbered. This has been confirmed elsewhere
through cases of suboptimal inter-organizational relations emerging as a result of, for
example, poor communication and strong tribal identities (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2010; Parker
& Stern, 2002). Crisis conditions can furthermore amplify factors that generally constrain
collaboration in normal times, including high transaction-costs, self-interested beha-
viour, and low trust. Identifying and analysing aspects of collaboration that appear to
work relatively well under these challenging conditions is clearly a productive path
forward.
Secondly, as highlighted in the introduction to the special issue (Douglas et al., 2020), an
important next step is to draw on insights from larger sets of cases to explore causal
relationships. Perhaps we may see progress on that front in the future, which might enable
large-N analyses of crises as a particular subset of collaborative governance. The literature
offers plenty of suggestions regarding what factorsmay enable high performing collaboration
in this specific context, including coordination, inclusion, and low conflict (Boin & ‘t Hart,
2010). Moreover, although we cannot empirically verify causal relationships, the cross-case
comparison was useful for identifying more specific patterns worthy of further investigation
once the number of collaborative crisis management cases expands in the future. Specifically,
it remains puzzling why actors across the cases, despite being faced with large-scale and
partially novel challenges, were mostly able to effectively contain conflict, formulate and
achieve shared goals, adapt to rapidly to changing situations and emergent structures, and
innovate in response to unforeseen problems. Research efforts to find the collective beha-
viours, structures, and processes that enabled these actions would partially require alternative
sources of data, but hold great potential as a next step to push this research frontier forward.
Finally, the seven cases also suggest that some common collaborative challenges are
likely to emerge regardless of the event type. For example, the evidence reviewed here
suggests that even if the ‘triggering events’ are different, the process of collaboration often
involves recurrent problems related to, for example, the mobilization of diverse sets of
actors and the coordination of joint activities. Comparative approaches can be leveraged to
assess how actors deal with these common challenges in different contexts, under varying
amounts of pressure, and in relation to different types of events. Studies could investigate
how different types of collaborative arrangements (e.g. self-organized versus hierarchically
orchestrated) respond to similar challenges. It can also be valuable to examine how similar
collaborative arrangements cope with different types of crises. Another potential line of
inquiry is to carry out comparative assessments over time to investigate how collaborative
arrangements change (Nohrstedt & Bodin, 2014) and the fluctuating levels of overlap
between planned or pre-existing networks and emergent crisis responder networks (Bodin
et al., 2019; Kapucu, 2005). Including the temporal dimension is also helpful for unveiling
processes of learning and how the outputs of learning, such as new or revised plans and
strategies, might affect collaborative crisis management regarding recurrent or similar
hazards (Nohrstedt & Parker, 2014; Parker, 2015).
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